

*Fall term 2007
STV4020
Emne i forskningsmetode og statistikk
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The Perils of Ethnic Cleansing

***A case study on how to apply Michael Mann's theory outlined in
"The Dark Side of Democracy"***

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Word count: 4530

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1. Introduction

Ethnic cleansing may be one of the darkest chapters of human civilization, and to delve into this field academically is no walk in the park. Yet, Michael Mann has taken up the task in his recent book "The Dark Side of Democracy" (2005). As a result, he claims to have developed a model that can explain the causes and mechanisms that give rise to ethnic cleansing. This abominable phenomenon is, as such, not a very common one. True ethnic cleansing has not occurred very often in known history. There are only a few cases to study. Mann nevertheless seeks to find similarities that allow him to generate a new theory. Ultimately, he wishes to raise awareness of the underlying mechanisms and to help to predict (and prevent) future cases of ethnic cleansing.

The purpose of this paper is to link his findings to practical procedure. How can his model help us to discern the potential for ethnic cleansing? The answer to this is of high relevance, particularly if the model comes to function as a tool for decision makers and their political advisors. To illustrate my evaluation, I will use the case of Iraq, a country under serious ethnic tensions. How these will develop if the U.S. decide to withdraw their troops is largely unknown.

"[A] Sunni-Shia stalemate would be a likelier outcome than the wholesale expulsion or genocide of the Sunni (...) because the Shias show little interest in conquering the Sunni areas, and because neither side has the aircraft, heavy artillery or armor to reduce cities to rubble and so inflict truly massive casualties. But most truly awful recent wars (Congo, Rwanda) were fought mainly with small arms. Running away would lead to a lethal free-for-all and a collapse into warlordism." (The Economist, 8.9.07: 29)

This quote gives an idea of how difficult the decision is. With pressure at home rising against what is frequently being characterized as a lost cause, the American government is facing the tough decision of a troop withdrawal. When, how complete, and how quickly this should be done remains unclear. However, the violent tensions between the various Iraqi factions suggest this country is on the brink to all-out civil war. Will an American retreat let the beast completely loose and lead to a brutal war among Iraqis? While some actors, such as neighboring Iran (BBC 9.8.2007), claim that pulling out U.S. troops is tantamount to peace in Iraq, others claim that such a

thing would provoke the opposite, namely the outbreak of a full-blown civil war (see e.g. The Guardian 23.8.2007).

Which of the two arguments is more plausible? This question justifies the difficult task of assessing such a case. Here, I seek to tackle the challenging questions revolving around such an assessment. Is the model of any valuable use to assist the relevant actors in decision-making?

2. Research question(s)

My research questions follow from the introductory remarks: *How likely is the scenario of murderous ethnic cleansing in Iraq? How can Michael Mann's theory be useful to find answers to this question?*

3. Methodology

To advance my arguments, I will first discuss the use of the case study to approach my research topic and why I deem process tracing an adequate method of analysis. After delivering some definitions, I will proceed in assessing Iraq in light of Mann's eight theses, and, finally, address process tracing by showing tentatively how the particular case in question can be analyzed. As we will see, the key in understanding his theory lies in connecting those eight theses to his process-tracing model of three phases of ethnic cleansing.

3.1 The Case Study

The *case study* was chosen as the method to perform the research. The case in question here is ethnic cleansing, while the unit of analysis will be one country. Within Ragin's conceptual framework, *ethnic cleansing* can be located as a "convention", a general, theoretical construct. I will not attempt to evaluate the concept of ethnic cleansing, but rather use it to structure my research. The theoretical implications of defining and using this concept are treated as external to my particular research

effort (Ragin 1992: 9-10). The case study is most adequate here as the research is aiming at an empirical assessment of a single case in light of a particular theory (see ch. 3.2). It is beyond the objective of this study to run a qualitative or quantitative comparative analysis between units of observation. Observing a single unit can be a useful technique when comparable to other researchers' observations (George and Bennett 2005: 220). Furthermore, elementary statistics teach us that as the number of variables approaches the number of observed units, the capacity to analyze associations between variables through comparison rapidly diminishes (Collier 1993: 105). Cases of ethnic cleansing as described and defined by Michael Mann (2005) are a rare and recent phenomenon, and the number of factors involved are numerous and difficult to control for statistically.

What is a case study, really? John Gerring describes the term as a “definitional morass” (2004: 342). There are indeed more definitions than this term can possibly bear without turning meaningless. Here, I will abide by Gerring's broad definition of “a case study is an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of units” (2004: 342). Although I am only interested in one “unit”, Iraq, and my method (see next chapter) does not provide direct scope for generalization, my approach may serve as a blueprint in how to use given concepts and how to perform a case assessment where this is needed.

3.2 Interpretative Case Study

The interpretative case-study method is selected when the primary focus is an interest in the case rather than in the theory; the aim is to throw light on a given case, not to improve the generalization of the theory used to approach the case (Lijphart: 1971: 691-692). Such “applied cases” have, in principle, no value in terms of theory building. However, it is precisely the purpose of empirical theory to make such interpretative case studies possible (1971: 692). Regardless of how pessimistically Michael Mann may depict the scope for actual consideration of his book by key decision makers, one purpose of his work is to endorse those among them who do not want to tolerate ethnic cleansing, and would like to know how to interpret the

signs that ask for action. From recognition comes the ability to formulate solutions (Mann 2005: 529). As Lijphart notes, the interpretative case study is an ideal type. Any particular study of a case may also fit other types.¹ The interpretative analysis of Iraq may turn out to confirm certain aspects of a theory, or raise new questions (1971: 691), but this will not be in the focus of my analysis.

3.3 Process Tracing

In applying the interpretative case-study method, the researcher is looking for certain scope conditions unfolding over time. Process tracing is therefore a useful starting point. Process tracing has achieved increasing academic recognition and widespread use by political scientists in the last few decades (George and Bennett 2005: 205). Although Michael Mann does not mention its explicit use, his method of analysis is clearly what a social scientist would call process tracing. He follows tracks, tracing one event to another, thereby finding the patterns and “ingredients” that produce or lead to the predicted outcome – or not, as in his two counterfactual cases in India and Indonesia (Mann 2005: 474-501).

The process-tracing method aims to identify the intervening causal process between independent and dependent variables. That is quite relevant; as George and Bennett (2005: 206) illustrate, from the observation of the first and last domino lying on the ground doesn't necessarily follow that all the intermediate dominoes must have fallen, too – unless one can observe them falling or otherwise prove such an event.² Process tracing does precisely look at such intermediate steps, unveiling causal chains³ and mechanisms (2005: 206). An important concept in process tracing is *equifinality*, where the investigator is forced to consider viable alternatives, to play out various scenarios with counterfactual logic that could have led to the same result, e.g. the last domino to fall (George and Bennett 2005: 207; Gerring 2007: 181). By connecting all possible intervening variables to one another in particular ways,

¹ Other case study types are either *a-theoretical* (descriptive), *concept- or hypothesis-generating*, *hypothesis-testing* (in-/confirming), or analyses of *deviant cases* (Lijphart: 1971: 691-692; George and Bennett 2005: 213; Andersen 1997).

² All dominoes could have fallen simultaneously as a consequence of, say, an earthquake, making the latter the causal, or intervening variable.

³ Rather than multiple instances of $X_1 \rightarrow Y$, as in statistical research, one examines a single instance of $X_1 \rightarrow X_2 \rightarrow X_3 \rightarrow Y$. The chain can also be more circuitous and with reverse effects (see Gerring 2007: 173).

different types of causality (see George and Bennett 2005: 212) can be distinguished and indeterminacy reduced. With this, process tracing can be “an effective tool to test theories that are well enough specified to make predictions about process and causal mechanisms” (2005: 210). In that case, it has the benefit of placing data and theory in close proximity. This quickly unveils what works, and what does not (Checkel 2005: 22). Generally, process tracing offers an alternative to making causal inferences via controlled comparison. The latter is not possible in this case, making process tracing the method of choice.⁴ More generally, process tracing can “identify single or different paths to an outcome, point out variables that were otherwise left out in the initial comparison of cases, check for spuriousness, and permit causal inference on the basis of a few cases or even a single case” (George and Bennett 2005: 215). The ramifications of such a case study may be quite broad in scope. Similar to Theda Skocpol’s detailed account of the French Revolution (1979, cit. in Gerring: 178-179), Michael Mann’s minutiae of events unfolding in a range of countries, ultimately bringing about ethnic cleansing, pertains to all states of our time when certain conditions are met (see ch. 4).⁵ As mentioned above, the chosen observation unit, Iraq, will be used to illustrate the procedure of assessing a case. The actual process tracing will only be of tentative quality.

3.4 Concepts: *Ethnicity* and *Ethnic Cleansing*

Ethnicity, often described as groups of people sharing a common culture and descent, is hardly an objective term. Culture is vague and descent “usually fictitious” (Mann 2005: 10).⁶ Shared language or religion are two strong ways of identifying ethnicities, it is however neither sufficient nor necessary and may not be of the same importance to certain groups. Serious tensions can occur between ethnic groups that actually share a common language (e.g. Bosniaks and Serbs) or religion (e.g. Turks and Kurds). At the same time, they may be of little relevance to ethnic groups (or nations) that speak several languages and have different confessions (e.g. the

⁴ On the limits of process tracing, see George and Bennett (2005: 222-223); a closely related, alternative approach of similar validity is the *congruence method* (2005: 182-204). Gerring (2007: 173), though, qualifies this as being part of the process-tracing method, while George and Bennett treat it separately.

⁵ Mann argues that while murderous ethnic cleansing as a consequence of the nation-state ideal has passed through its final stage in the North, it is now moving through the less developed South (2005: 506-518).

⁶ For a discussion of ethnicity, see e.g. Ted Gurr (1993).

Swiss). Given the diversity of definitions, Mann argues that “it may be safer to define ethnicities subjectively, in terms they themselves, or their neighbors use” (2005: 11). Consequently, an *ethnicity* is a group that defines itself or is defined by others as sharing common descent and culture. *Ethnic cleansing* is therefore the removal of one such group by members of another such group from the locality they define as their own. A *nation* is an ethnic group that has political consciousness, claiming collective political rights on a given territory (Mann 2005: 11).

Table 1 (see Appendix) displays the various stages and levels Mann identifies in ethnic cleansing. Most terms speak for themselves and their location in the table is an indication of how to interpret their magnitude (see Mann 2005: 11-18 for further details). The most violent categories have darker shading. *Politicide* is a recent term describing extermination of a group’s actual or potential leadership. *Ethnocide* is an unintended or unplanned extermination, while *genocide* is planned and intends to wipe out a group both physically and culturally.⁷

Mann clearly lines out his concept of human agency and contingency. He denounces to describe perpetrators in collective terms, i.e. whole ethnic groups or state elites. In this view, perpetrators are always *some* Germans or *some* Serbs, coming disproportionately from certain core constituencies. Ethnonationalists often have to overcome dissidents within their own group, who may face the choice between joining the cause or getting killed (2005: 20-22). Similarly, he does not assume human beings to be rational actors in all circumstances, but rather adopts a dynamic, multi-faceted view on human action that includes rational, emotional, and normative aspects (2005: 25-26). This is also mirrored in his seventh and eighth thesis (see next chapter), which by some accounts (Breuilly et al. 2006: 393) constitutes the originality and significance of Michael Mann’s book.

⁷ An example of ethnocide is the original Caribbean islanders’ extinction, mostly through diseases and overworking. Neither was it intentional, nor was much done to prevent it. Genocide attempts also to destroy churches, libraries etc. of a given culture (Mann 2005: 16 and 17).

4. Iraq in Focus

In assessing the case of Iraq, this analysis will give an idea of the theory’s empirical usefulness. Before applying the three-phase model (see Fig. 1 in the Appendix) on the chosen unit of observation, one needs to assess whether the scope conditions are present. The most fruitful approach would be to use Mann’s eight arguments, or theses (see Mann 2005: 2-10). I have given each argument a name based on Mann’s description: (1) *Dark Side of Democracy*, (2) *Ethnicity Dominant Strata*, (3) *Legitimate Territorial Claim*, (4) *Prefer Violence*, (5) *Radicalism and Instability*, (6) *Final Solution as Plan C*, (7) *Three Perpetrator Levels*, and (8) *Ordinary Killers*. They proceed from the general to the particular and from the macro to the micro level, “successively adding parts of an overall explanation” (Mann 2005: 2). I will follow the same order in my analysis. The definitions are given in Table 2.

Tab. 2 Michael Mann’s Eight General Theses

1. Dark Side of Democracy	<p>Murderous cleansing is modern and...</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - ... a hazard of the age of democracy (nationalist ethnicide or socialist classicide) - ... worse in more democratic than in more authoritarian settler colonies - ... more likely in democratizing states - ... is never committed by a democratic regime
2. Ethnicity Dominant Strata	<p>Ethnic hostility rises where ethnicity trumps class as the main form of social stratification.</p>
3. Legitimate Territorial Claim	<p>The danger zone of murderous cleansing is reached when:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Two fairly old ethnic groups claim the same or overlapping territory b) The claim seems to have substantial legitimacy and some plausible chance of being implemented
4. Prefer Violence	<p>The brink of murderous cleansing is reached when either scenario a or b plays out:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) The weaker side is bolstered to fight (rather than to submit) by believing in outside help b) The stronger side believes it can crush the weaker with little physical or moral effort
5. Radicalism and Instability	<p>Going over the brink occurs when the contested territory’s state has become factionalized and radicalized amid an unstable geopolitical environment that usually leads to war.</p>
6. Final Solution as Plan C	<p>Murderous cleansing is rarely the initial intent of perpetrators (“Plan C”).</p>
7. Three Perpetrator Levels	<p>There are three levels (which are interlinked, and necessary) of perpetrators: Radical elites, paramilitaries, and core constituencies (mass, but not majority).</p>

8. Ordinary Killers

Ordinary people are brought by normal social structures into committing murderous ethnic cleansing.

Source: Michael Mann (2005: 2-10).

“Things can get really nasty” *when sovereignty is the issue* (thesis 3) and *geopolitical instability is the process* (thesis 5), as Mann points out in his concluding remarks (2005: 501). Without their combination, cycles of ethnic violence ensue as cycles (see Fig. 1 in the App.). States that have the capacity to repress escalation tend to do so. I will return to this later.

In the following, a critical assessment of whether the conditions in Iraq raise the likelihood of ethnic cleansing will be given based on the arguments in Table 2. I will draw on my earlier work, where I analyzed the scope for consociational power sharing in Iraq (Miard 2006).⁸ Other sources used will be mainly the (excellent) International Crisis Group reports and newspaper articles.

4.1 Dark Side of Democracy

Iraq has a history of utterly violent and authoritarian rule (see Miard 2006: 35-36). Before 2003, however, it was a relatively strong state capable of effective repression of communal conflict. Since the invasion, Iraq has been forcefully put into a process of democratization. *Democratizing states* are seen as more prone to the outbreak of ethnic cleansing (see Tab. 2; Mann 2005: 4).

4.2 Ethnicity Dominant Strata

Ethnicity clearly trumps class as the main form of stratification.⁹ Iraqi constituencies seem to increasingly define themselves in ethnoreligious terms, mainly along Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish lines. A clear indicator are the 2005 elections, where less than 10 percent did *not* vote along ethnoreligious lines (see Miard 2006: 20). Some criticize that for the first time in Iraqi history, sectarianism and ethnicity have become the formal organizing principle of politics and that the simplistic view of the Iraqi society

⁸ Where quoting myself, I refer to the various sources used in my (downloadable) paper (Miard 2006).

⁹ According to Farouk/Sluglett (2001: 18-19), Iraq was characterized by an immense and ever-increasing polarization between rich and poor up to 1958, when General Qasim put himself to power.

by the Coalitional Provisional Authority has set a troubling precedent, entrenching the previously less adversarial sectarian positions (Crisis Group 2006: 10).¹⁰

4.3 Legitimate Territorial Claim

There are three larger ethnic groups in Iraq competing for power and resources. Kurds, predominantly living in Iraq's north, account for about 17 percent of the population. They speak their own Kurdish language(s) and are mainly of Sunni denomination (see Miard 2006: 20). Approximately 20 percent are Sunni Arabs, mainly residing in Iraq's western provinces. The largest group, accounting for about 60 percent of the population, are the Shia Arabs¹¹, mainly located in the south of Iraq. The population figures stated here should be taken with caution (see Miard 2006: 21), but they give a rough estimate of the proportions.

Mann stresses that danger arises when "two fairly old" groups compete for territory. Both the Kurds and Sunni Arabs can be described as such "old" ethnicities. However, while Shia Islam as such is undoubtedly quite old¹², it is less so in Iraq. According to Nakash (1994), most southern Iraqi tribes converted to Shi'ism in the 19th century only. Mann remains unclear on what he considers "fairly old", merely stating that his argument doesn't apply to "newly constructed" identities (2005: 503). At any rate, describing the Iraqi Shi'is as "newly constructed" does not seem adequate.

Iraq is also slightly at odds with Michael Mann's condition of bi-ethnic confrontations (2005: 6). However, he mentions that where there are more than two rival groups, they can arrange themselves into bipolar confrontations (2005: 503). This is probably the case in Iraq, as clashes seem to mainly occur between Sunni Arabs and Kurds in the north, and between Sunni and Shia Arabs in the south and centre.

¹⁰ Crisis Group (2006: 8) equals the Coalitional Provisional Authority's reductionism in analysing Iraq in sectarian terms as a "self-fulfilling prophecy".

¹¹ Despite their close relations to Iran, with which they share their Shia denomination, they are not Persians but Arabs. The distinction is very important. For more on this, see Miard (2006: 29-30).

¹² Shi'is belong to a Muslim confession that separated from the larger Sunni branch shortly after the death of the Prophet Mohammed.

4.3.1 Kurds vs. Sunni Arabs

Allegedly the largest ethnic group in the world without a state (O’Leary 2002), the Kurds have been pressing for their own state for decades. Saddam Hussein ruthlessly suppressed them culturally, and occasionally also threatened their very physical existence. He had, among other things, the boundaries of the Kurdish, oil-rich Kirkuk province redrawn and launched large resettlement programs in an attempt to “Arabize” Kurdish lands (Farouk/Sluglett 2001: 26, cit. in Miard 2006: 28). As a consequence of this Arabization, Kurds feel they have a legitimate claim on Kirkuk province and other areas at the fringes of “Kurdistan”, their core lands. This causes considerable tensions in Kirkuk in particular (see Miard 2006: 34).

4.3.2 Shia Arabs vs. Sunni Arabs

Prior to the U.S.-led invasion, little territorial claims seem to have been expressed by Shi’is. Apart from being excluded from power by Sunni-dominated institutions such as the army and the omnipotent Ba’ath party (see Miard 2006: 30), Shi’is do not seem to have been under existential pressure, unlike the Kurds.¹³ However, recent events have caused internal resettlement, with many Sunnis fleeing from the south northwards, while Shi’is doing so the other way round. A similar pattern is visible within the capital, Baghdad. A particular surge in such internal displacements has been triggered by the attack on the al-Ashkari shrine, a sacred place to Shi’is, in February 2006 (2006: 34; see ch. 5). A possible consequence of these rather disorganized displacements could be quasi-official population exchanges, a severe form of cleansing according to Mann’s definition (see Tab. 1 in the App.). Regionally, but rather not altogether, the perceived legitimacy and plausible chance to permanently implement territorial claims may be significant.

¹³ However, thousands of Shi’is were expelled from Iraq to Iran in the late 1970’s on account of a fabricated “Persian connection” (see Miard 2006: 30).

4.4. Prefer Violence

The second category – crushing the enemy at little physical or moral cost – is not applicable in this case; Mann bases this argument on the concept of “preemptive” genocide (2005: 503).¹⁴ This seems unlikely at this point (compare quote in ch. 1). The first category – being bolstered to fight believing in outside help – may lead to civil war, which in turn can evolve into ethnic cleansing. This distinct variant seems more likely in Iraq. While the Kurds are not immediately threatened in their core lands, the on-going conflict between Sunni and Shia Arabs that appears to be a civil war in all but its name may fit this category. The weaker group, the Sunnis, could be bolstered to fight believing in support by foreign Sunnis and Sunni countries. A worrying factor is the infiltration of Iraqi police and commando units through Shia factions, because effective ethnic cleansing relies on state capacity (Crisis Group 2006: 3; Mann 2005: 7 and 23).

4.5 Radicalism and Instability

The constant stream of violent news from Iraq indicates the state of radicalization and factionalization it has reached. Examples may be the Sunni Arab insurgents, initially in alliance with al-Zarqawi’s Iraqi subsidiary of al-Qaeda (Crisis Group 2006: 14-17), while on the Shia side the Badr Corps and Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army have been the most prominent, but not the only actors (2006: 17-21). The Kurds seem to, for now, have overcome their rivalries, keeping the north in relative stability and safety (see Miard 2006: 29). The Iraqi government has been weak and fractious, working in a rather unproductive manner (see e.g. BBC, 11.11.2007).

In Mann’s theory, the *geopolitical situation* plays an important role in destabilizing the state, giving rise to factions who seize power amidst instability. The crisis with Iran, a country with strong interests in Iraq, that revolves around its governments desire to process uranium may be a growing factor of insecurity. Likewise, Turkey’s saber-rattling public discourse towards Kurdish Iraqis may become an element of instability

¹⁴ The Armenian case in Turkey displays this type, where killing and deporting the potential “5th column” was seen as a necessary preemptive strike, feasible at relatively little cost (see Mann 2005: 111-179).

in the north (see e.g. BBC, 13.11.2007). However, the real danger arises when there is war with or in a neighboring country (Mann 2005: 7).

4.6 Final Solution as Plan C, Three Perpetrator Levels, and Ordinary Killers

The last three arguments are not observable at this point. *Final Solution as Plan C* merely states that actual genocide is rarely the initial intent of perpetrators, but rather an alternative plan that emerges as a consequence of earlier plans that have failed. With intimate knowledge of a movement's intentions, one could predict whether such an escalation, corresponding to thesis 4b (see above), is likely. Such knowledge, however, is usually inaccessible (Mann 2005: 7-8; 504). *Three Perpetrator Levels* argues for a complex interaction between radical elites, bands of violent militants and supporting core constituencies to be necessary to advance the conditions for ethnic cleansing.¹⁵ Some potential harbingers can be discernible in Iraq, particularly among the Shi'is: radical elites such as SCIRI¹⁶ and Muqtada al-Sadr, with their own paramilitary units, the Badr Corps and the Mahdi Army (see above), as well as their core constituencies, e.g. victims of previous sectarian eviction.¹⁷

5. Bringing the Process in

With the conditions under which ethnic cleansing is more likely to occur evaluated, the next step would be to analyze the processes playing out in the given case. What Mann actually states, is that ethnic violence moves in more or less controlled cycles under normal circumstances, which he calls *phase 1*, or *communal conflict* (see Fig. 1 in the App.). It can, however, tilt into *phase 2: escalation*, if the conditions stated in his eight theses facilitate this, particularly thesis 3 and 5 (Mann 2005: 501). The final stage is *phase 3: murderous cleansing* (2005: 477; Appendix). Here, Mann remains

¹⁵ This interaction is to create the relations – mainly hierarchy, comradeship, and career – that later strongly influence the perpetrator's motives (see Mann 2005: 8-9 for more on this).

¹⁶ The *Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq*. A highly recommendable report on this organization has recently been published by the International Crisis Organization (Crisis Group 2007).

¹⁷ On the Sunni side the picture is less clear. Groups with distinct, strong "brands" are less visible, particularly after the apparent collapse of al-Qaeda (see Miard 2006: 37; BBC 2007, 11.11.2007). As mentioned earlier, the Kurds show a more unified behavior and have been the U.S.' most reliable ally in Iraq.

unspecific about what facilitates transition; it may be a fluid process. In the following, I will only tentatively show a possible starting point and further proceeding.

The analysis should start, as predicted by Mann's three-phase model, with the *trigger*, typically a rumor of an atrocity committed by ethnic group B (see Fig. 1 in the App.) affecting ethnic group A. Two very powerful events in the case of Iraq were decisive in triggering outbursts of sectarian violence: The first was the car bombing in front of the Imam Ali Mosque in August 2003 that killed Ayatollah Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim, the powerful and charismatic SCIRI leader (Crisis Group 2006: 1). The second was the attack on the sacred al-Ashkari shrine in Samarra in February 2006 (see Miard 2006: 34). One can clearly see the evolving picture if calling the Sunni group B and the Shi'is group A. Tracking events that followed this would shed light on the processes playing out and interacting. For example, Sunni residents in Shia-dominated areas of Baghdad were killed in revenge for the Samarra bombing (see BBC, 11.11.2007). Official civilian and police death tolls related to violent attacks rose from an average of 800 in 2004 and 2005 to over 1000 per month after the Samarra incident (see Miard 2006: 37). The next step would be to trace possible state bias towards group A, which appears to be the case (see ch. 4.4). Is there any pressure from neighboring Sunni (B) states, causing e.g. Shia politicians to call for pogroms? Tracing all events with the use of Mann's model (see Appendix) and connecting them is a productive way to come to terms with the purpose of such an analysis: What is happening, how bad can it get, where is action needed?

6. Conclusion

The special element of a large occupying army, as present in Iraq, does not figure in Mann's generic cases. However, every future case of ethnic cleansing is likely to have, in retrospect, a number of peculiarities. Moreover, the starting point of this paper was the question: What happens if the U.S. armed forces leave?¹⁸ With such a future-oriented analysis, assumptions must inevitably be made. Mann's model seems sufficiently simple and exact (Gerring 2007: 181) to apply it on the case, and the

¹⁸ The counterfactual Indian case, where British troops withdrew in 1947, has some similarities, see Mann (2005: 474-490).

properties of process tracing allow deciding whether the data fits the theory or not. The tentative analysis gives reason to believe that *phase 1* is playing out in Iraq. The predicted mechanisms can be observed. The current situation (see BBC, 11.11.2007) is probably right at the lowest *phase 1* case in the model (see Fig. 1 in the App.), with the state, or in this particular case rather the American troops, trying to clamp down on the sectarian violence. The next question, which is at the core of Michael Mann's work, is to evaluate whether *phase 2* is a likely event. Such a probability may be identified through his eight theses. Of the observable first five theses, all but one indicate that some concern is justified (see ch. 4). In thesis 5, incidentally one Mann singles out as crucial for "things" to "get really nasty", geopolitical instability does not seem to be at a convincingly serious level yet. Such severe instability, however, could precisely be a consequence of an American troop withdrawal. Seen in this perspective, the U.S. government has good reasons to evaluate the question very carefully.

I have demonstrated here how to apply Mann's theory on a particular case. More in-depth research is needed for a truly proper assessment, but the procedure in analyzing other cases should be similar to the one I have shown using Iraq as an example.

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
Appendix

Tab. 1 Types of Violence and Cleansing in Intergroup Relations


Types of Violence	Types of Cleansing		
	None	Partial	Total
1. None	1. Multiculturalism 2. Consociationalism/ Confederalism	Partial Abandoning of Identity (e.g. voluntary official language adoption)	Voluntary Assimilation
2. Institutional Coercion	Discrimination	1. Official Language Restrictions 2. Segregation	Cultural Suppression
3. Policed Repression	Selective Policed Repression	1. Policed Partial Repression of Out-Group Language/Culture 2. Policed Out-Group Settlement/Displacement	1. Policed Total Suppression of Out- Group Language/Culture 2. Population Exchanges 3. Policed Deportation/ Pressured Emigration
4. Violent Repression	Generalized Policed Repression	1. Pogroms, Communal Riots, Rape 2. Violent Settlement/Displacement	1. Wild Deportation and Emigration 2. Sterilization, Forced Marriage, Rape
5. Unpremeditated Mass Deaths	Mistaken War, Civil War, Revolutionary Projects, Fratricide	Callous War, Civil War, Revolutionary Projects	Ethnocide
6. Premeditated Mass Killing	Exemplary and Civil War Repression, Systematic Reprisals	1. Forced Conversion 2. Politicide 3. Classicide	Genocide

Note: Lighter shading represents the borderline zone, darker shading the murderous cleansing zone. Source: Mann 2005: 12.


Fig. 1 The Three Phases of Murderous Ethnic Cleansing (Source: Mann 2005: 477)



See next page for phase 2 and 3



Phase 2: Escalation



Phase 3: Murderous cleansing